The ideological debate over the social welfare system

by Christian Steffen

Every social welfare system is deeply rooted in the political culture of a nation. Without going into great length, a few opening remarks concerning the fundamental cultural differences between Germany and the United States need to be addressed and clarified. The author is very well aware of the fact that an approach like this involves the danger of simplification and stereotyping, for in every nation competing ideas and attitudes are omnipresent; on the other hand I only intend to uncover majority beliefs that, in effect, influence and shapes the policy output of the political system. Put simply the differences can be narrowed down to two central observations. Firstly, in the United States there seems to be a widespread distrust against policies imposed by the federal government and secondly, an ideal of what can be called "responsible individualism" is upheld. The American social welfare systems developed accordingly. When compared to Germany, the system is highly fragmented, less encompassing, offers loss benefits and is financed by multiple sources.

On a more abstract level one can say that the extension of the social welfare system constitutes a value of its own in Germany. The history of the continent has made it clear that social peace is a precondition for a sustained development. The so called "post war settlement", that is the establishment of a capitalist economy with a strong emphasis on improving and securing the living conditions of the population emerged, and its impact can still be felt today. In Germany, for instance, there has been and, to a large extend, still is a general consensus that social entitlements are somewhat of a "sacred cow" that needs to remain untouched. In the US such a consensus never really did exist. Social welfare programs were never assigned an intrinsic value of their own. Every measure taken in this area can be summarized under the label of crisis management; first the problem emerged and then, with a delayed reaction, a policy was introduced to deal with it. To sum things up one can say that the different national heritage lead to fundamental differences in the political culture of the two nations. In regard to social welfare it seems legitimate to claim that in Germany social welfare is commonly accepted by a vast majority as being an integral part of society whereas in the United States it is not (or to a much lesser degree). At this point it remains to be said that this statement in no way intends to be judgmental; the possible inference that individualism translates in egoism as a trademark of the American society can be dismissed by looking at the extensive privately organized welfare sector.

The ideological debate over the future of the welfare state, that emerged in the late 1960's/early 1970's in the US, needs to be looked at in the context mentioned above. As argued, social welfare (not to be confused with the commonly accepted social security) is not rooted in the American society. This allows for an intense debate with little constraints; colloquially said, everything is open for grabs. But this alone would be insufficient to explain the welfare debate, especially when the ideological component is taken into consideration. Every ideology, which can be defined as a comprehensive and mutually consistent set of ideas by which a social group makes sense of the world around them, arises in a time of a perceived crisis. Circumstances, that have formerly been accepted, become subject of intense debate and are being questioned. In a sense, every ideology needs a counterpart from which it can distinguish itself, a tendency that is very visible in the American welfare debate. In short, one can say that the current welfare system is the mainstream counter-ideology. From across the political and ideological spectrum there is now almost universal acknowledgment that the American social welfare system has been a failure. The underlying reasoning runs as follows. Since the start of the "War on Poverty" under the Johnson administration (only possible due to a historically unique situation) more than $ 3.5 trillion have been spent trying to ease the plight of the poor. Yet, it seems that despite these massive transfer payments the only payoff was more poverty and more poverty related crimes. In other words, the vision of the "Great Society", that is the belief that the fate of the nation can be determined via social engineering by the federal government has lost its advocates and slowly, in the eyes of the majority, turned into the source of the problem. In the following I will name three groups that shape the current debate, map out their main arguments and, at last, try to evaluate their influence in order to be able to offer an educated guess what the social welfare system of the US will most likely look like in the near future. Needless to say that the distinction between the groups becomes more and more problematic when we move away from the core beliefs. Just like in every political mass party there are wings and fractions; due to structural causes the ideological spectrum within the parties is much wider than for instance in Germany.

The groups mentioned above are the following: 1. Liberals, 2. Conservatives and 3. Radicals. I will start my discussion with the Liberals and the Conservatives who, as I see it, correspond to a great extend to the political agendas of the Democratic and Republian party. Since Democrats and Republicans are the dominant political actors in the US, regularly competing in general elections, neither group, as a whole, can afford to go to extremes. As mentioned above both parties share the conclusion that the current system leads to suboptimal policy results; the remedies they suggest range, depending on one's own political orientation, from being similar to being antagonistic. Concerning the Democrats, a programmatic change took place during the last few years; the new Democrats shied away from the "tax and spend" image and, under the leadership of President Clinton, tried to present themselves in a different light. Despite this programmatic shift though, the Democrats recognize that there is a large part of the population that depends on welfare money and this observation is used as a foundation the Democrats build their social policy on. The often heard reproach that the Democrats try to solve the current crisis by throwing good money after bad money, that is reforming the system by an increase in funds, is invalid. In reality the Democrats try to solve the problem of poverty, which is essentially the underlying topic of the welfare debate, by trying to offer programs that enable the poor to reach a point where they can support themselves rather than living on welfare. Poverty, in the eyes of the Democrats, is a structural problem - the underprivileged part of society needs to be equipped with better tools so that they acquire the necessary skills needed for permanent employment.

The Republicans tend to view poverty more in terms of individual shortcomings. They do not reject structural causes offhand but put a much stronger emphasis on the behavior of people. Religion, morality and an accentuation of traditional values like hard work, intact families and responsibility for oneself are being stressed. In order to overcome the current crisis the Republicans aim at restoring the values mentioned above via a complex mix of incentives and disincentives. Programs like "workfare" and "LEARNfare" were introduced to directly change the behavior of people. For instance the eligibility for the former AFDC assistance for single mothers was linked to the school attendance record of the child. In other words, the Republicans or Conservatives tried to change the social welfare system in a way that "abnormal" behavior becomes subject of punishment while, at the same time, conformity is rewarded. To come back to the question whether or not Republicans and Democrats follow different ideological concepts in regard to social welfare reform the overall picture remains somewhat fuzzy. As mentioned above, Democrats tend to put more emphasis on the structural causes of poverty whereas, in the eyes of the Republicans, the problem is more a result of decaying values and therefore can only be solved via an government fostered change of behavior. Despite these obvious differences I find it difficult to speak of opposing ideologies in this context. Democrats, as well as Republicans, share the conviction that the poverty problem can only be solved if active measures on all political levels are taken. The differences in the promoted policies are differences in degree, rather than in kind. From a European perspective some of the proposals of both groups (such as the Clinton initiative to restrict welfare payments to two years) might seem rather "extreme"; in the American context both groups advocate moderate policies that are able to stand at an election.

The third group, which I call radicals, developed an ideology that aims at ending the social welfare system, that is abolishing it in its entirety. Again the perceived failure of the current system provides the background for their analysis which I now will address in greater detail. Roughly at the time of the Reagan inauguration the radical perspective on the welfare system emerged; in particular two books published at that time proved to be very influential - George Gilder's "Wealth and Poverty" (1981) and Charles Murray's "Losing Ground: American Social Policy 1950 - 1980" (1984). Both authors attempted to provide a scientific rationale for reducing social benefits by introducing the following concepts,

• the law of unintended consequences and

• the culture of poverty.

Their reasoning goes as follows. The poor are paid to remain poor, there is no incentive to work. People need to feel the poverty in order to develop a sincere desire to find a way out of it. As long as the poor receive transfer payments there seems to be little need to actively look for an entry level job. The prolonged state of being unemployed, that is being welfare dependent, cumulates in a culture of poverty that is self perpetuating and ultimately results in more poverty. It is argued, that welfare payments destroy family structures for the income is mostly child dependent. The traditional provider role of the family members ceases to exist, a feeling of uselessness sets in that, in combination with little responsibilities and an abundance of time, fosters violence, crime and drug abuse - circumstances under which family values erode.

Again it seems that poverty and welfare dependency are explained in terms of individual, private causes, while public and economic causes are dismissed. But the debate moved beyond this point, Glider's and Murray's observations merely triggered a discussion, that became much more sophisticated over time. The underlying message of the two mentioned books is that poverty equals immorality; poor people are portrayed as being morally deviant which is the reason for their welfare dependency. The next Generation of radicals, such as David Frum (Dead Right, 1994) or Michael Tanner (director of health and welfare studies at the Cato Institute) took the debate to a new level. Both agree, that the welfare recipients are neither lazy, unwilling to work or different in any way from the "normal" working people. They stress, that the current system does not contain any option for the welfare recipients but to remain dependent; welfare dependency is therefore a result of "handouts". David Frum argues:

Risk makes people circumspect. It disciplines them and teaches them self-control. Without a safety net, people won't try to vault across the big top. Social Security, student loans, and other government programs make it far less catastrophic than it used to be for middle-class people to dissolve their families. Without welfare and food stamps, poor people would cling harder to working class respectability than they do now. Big government does for the 98 percent of society that is not rich what her millions did for the late Barbara Hunton - it enables them to engage in destructive behavior without immediately suffering the consequences (4).

The difference between Conservatives and Radicals is, that the Radicals have lost faith in the belief that behavior can be managed by the government. Consequently Tanner accuses the Conservatives (even more so the Democrats) that the search for a mystical combination of rewards and punishment is a fruitless endeavor; instead the course taken should lead to a state where all programs are abolished that insulate people from the natural consequences of their actions. In order to back his thesis Tanner refers to a variety of empirical studies which support his radical view. In a nutshell, the empirical studies he offers show that:

• poverty has actually increased since the start of the "War on Poverty".

• people not receiving welfare benefits move out of poverty much more quickly.

• an increase in welfare benefits leads to an increase in the rate of out-of-wedlock births

among teenagers (resulting in more poverty).

• the combined tax-free value of welfare benefits is roughly equal to the income that can

be earned at many entry level or low paying jobs.

• that almost 70% of welfare recipients are not actively seeking work.

• that the job-training programs do not ease the transition from unemployment to steady

employment.

No need to go into greater detail. The Radicals reasoning becomes quite obvious when looked at the surveys enumerated above. In Tanner's eyes, poverty, welfare dependency and related problems such as crime and drug abuse are the result of government interference that needs to be stopped at once. Individuals unable to support themselves through the job market should be forced to fall back on the resources of family, church and community, or private charity. The role the government should play in politics is very limited in the radicals scheme - the government has to pursue policies that stimulate

growth and create jobs via reducing regulations and cutting taxes. If enough growth is spurred, the demand for labor will increase and eventually a sufficient number of jobs will be available for those actively looking for one. According to the radicals reasoning this drastic approach, as cruel as it may sound, is the only way to save future generations from the hideous impact of an extensive welfare system. Tanner says: "Some say it would be too cruel, that it would punish the victim. But what could be crueler than sacrificing another Generation to our current social welfare muddle? (16).

To come back to the question what the social welfare system of the US will look like in the near future one can only say that drastic changes will not occur within the next few years, even if a Republican wins the next presidential elections. The Reagan experience shows that lofty rhetoric does not automatically translate into a new style of politics in regard to cutting public spending and welfare policies. Reagan did manage to tighten eligibility for some programs but did not succeed with overhauling the entire welfare system, at least not in a material way. For the time to come it seems to be a safe assumption that the American welfare system will be at the center of an intense debate but, at the same time, proves to be quite persistent or even immune to proposals of drastic change. A very likely scenario is a slight shift of emphasis towards more self-responsibility and mechanisms of advancement via better education and skills; a strategy that stands a good chance of receiving support from both political parties. In short, as of today the extreme measures suggested by Tanner and Frum do not immediately threaten the current welfare system so many people rely on. However, if they do manage to gain influence among conservative circles there is a chance that the public opinion is slowly altered. A marginal change in the general attitude of the population (see opening remarks) may provide the critical mass of support necessary for the implementation of more drastic measures, especially when the public perception that the current system has been an expensive failure, grows in strength.

selected sources:

Lawrence C. Dodd and Calvin Jillson: The Dynamics of American Politics; 1994.

David Frum: Dead Right; 1994.

George Gilder: Wealth and Poverty; 1981.

Jürgen Heideking: Geschichte der USA; 1996.

Robert S. McElavaine: What’s left; 1996.

Charles Murray: Losing Ground, American Social Policy 1950 – 1980; 1984.

Rainer Prätorious: Die USA, politischer Prozeß und soziale Probleme; 1997.

Micheal Tanner: Ending Welfare As We Know it; 1994.